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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
EXECUTIVE POWERS.
The machinery enforcing the National Industrial Recovery Act
has been stopped several times by federal courts ruling adversely in
regard to the constitutionality of various provisions of the Act. A
recent example is found in the case of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.'
On its face, the suit purports to avoid restraint on transportation
of oil; the essential problem, however, is neither regulation of inter-
state and foreign commerce nor conservation of natural resources,
but resolves itself into the vital question of the nature of executive
powers.
Generically, the Panama case is but another phase of the prob-
lem of sovereignty. Concepts of political sovereignty have altered
profoundly with the passage of historic eras.2 Whereas it is not at
all difficult to envision a psychological and political coup in the in-
fancy of this nation creating Washington George the First of
America, we are nevertheless constrained to accept the facts of suc-
cessive federalism, unionism and nationalism in our political life.
The serial metamorphoses to which the American concept of sover-
eignty has been subject have in no manner worked a derogation of
the principles that "sovereignty is divisible, but independence is not"
and that "sovereignty resides in the community."
The entire scheme of evolving nationalism from 1793 to the
present demonstrates the inescapable necessity of unified government
for 6ertain defined, administrative purposes. This is merely a cyclic
repetition in history of the progress of sovereignty. It is likewise
a matter of delegated powers, yielded primarily by the community
to a state, and secondarily from the people and states to the national
government. Delegation implies a right of control or resumption of
authority. It is one thing to delegate powers; it is quite another to
surrender powers. Surrender implies a total and absolute relin-
quishment-a consummated delivery of authority. Inherent in the
Constitution is the fundamental separation of governmental powers
that operates to check and prevent arbitrary usurpation of authority.
That delegation of powers and compulsion of conduct thereby
is improper per se is reducible to an absurdity.3 However, on the
basis of experience and reason, delegation of powers is justifiable
only under well-defined conditions subject to express limitations,
restraint and review. The current industrial and social revolution
carries with it the implication that basic concepts of government may
suffer assault; 4 that social excitement and the stress of economic
' U. S. - 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
2 "The conceptions of sovereignty which we inherit are derived from the
primitive system of personal allegiances. That is why the conception of sov-
ereignty has become increasingly confused as modern civilization has become
more complex." LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO MORALS (1929) 265.
' (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 400.
'"The National Recovery Act and its Codes are advanced industrial legis-
lation and may be viewed as a current on which the Ship of State rides between
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circumstance may tend to obscure reason; and that emergency may
lend a practical substantiality to the whim and caprice of expedience
that overshadows theoretical considerations of law and constitution-
ality. The Ptnanuz case is an instance in which the vigilance of the
Supreme Court has elevated principle above expedience.
The national executive derives his powers either from the Con-
stitution 5 or from acts of Congress. All executive action must be
justified on one or the other ground. "It is not enough that the
action in question is not forbidden by a Statute or by the Constitu-
tion." 6 Congress may empower the executive to act and to make
rules and regulations in furtherance of such conduct empowered by
the Congress; but the executive must not alter, restrict or enlarge
the act.7 A writ of injunction will not issue to restrain the Presi-
dent from carrying into execution an act of Congress alleged to be
unconstitutional; 8 nor will mandamus issue to compel him to per-
form a discretionary act.9 The President, however, has no law-
making power. Delegation of power by the Congress to the execu-
tive must be specific and particular to be valid.
The nearest approach to arbitrary sovereign power sanctioned
under our theory of government is found in the executive's right to
issue proclamations. Such authority must evince some connection,
however tenuous, with an act of Congress or "the duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." A proclamation is not an
assumption of legislative power.10
There are certain ill-defined peculiarities of executive behavior,
attributable to circumstance and personality, that may be glossed over
on occasion. Thus, the President may derive implied authority from
a course 6f long-continued conduct, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, to do an act without express statutory authorization."
In time of war, panic, social unrest and international adventure, the
President may undertake to do certain acts that achieve sanction.
Under the Embargo Acts, President Jefferson issued a procla-
mation to local officers closing American ports to named classes of
shipping. A federal court held the Embargo Act of April 25, 1808,
to be unconstitutional. 12 Thereafter, President Jefferson issued to
collectors of ports letters which, in substance and effect, commanded
the Scylla of imperial industrialism and the Charybdis of dictatorial com-
munism." Id. at 416.
1U. S. CoNsT. Art. IL
"United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 272 Fed. 311 (S. D.
N. Y. 1921).
7IhI re Temtor Corn and Fruit Products Co., 299 Fed. 326 (E. D. Mo.
1924).8 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (U. S. 1867).
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
10 Sugar v. United States, 252 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
" United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 35 Sup. Ct. 309 (1915).
'2 Ex parte Gilchrist, 5 Hughes 1 (1808).
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such officers to ignore the ruling of the federal court.' 3 Moreover,
Jefferson felt that the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory was
unconstitutional and would require an amendment to validate the
act of purchase. Adams had similar qualms in regard to Texas.
Theodore Roosevelt on occasion employed tactics verging on
arbitrary imperialism. The Venezuela Affair 14 is one example;
the Panama Affair 15 is another. Woodrow Wilson, after engaging in
diplomatic encounters with European experts came home with a
"League of Nations" that the country did not want.' 6
The Supreme Court in the Panama case indicates that the Presi-
dent may wield neither the Big Stick nor the Olive Branch without
let or hindrance; it would seem that there must be a standard, a
criterion, a specific, guiding policy under which the executive is re-
quired to make findings before manipulating the Stick or the Branch.
When the Congress declares a policy, it may delegate powers to
executive officials to achieve the practical realization of affairs under
such policy. The executive may not proceed by mere whim and
license to attain the desirable end; and this is true regardless of high
purpose and motive. The philosophy of Jefferson in enforcing the
Embargo Acts must be interpreted with the knowledge that he lost
one-half of his personal income from tobacco crops by such enforce-
ment; 17 the act was declaratory against his personal interest; but
nobility of motive cannot displace the requirement of lawful author-
ity. Where motive alone is the basis of executive action, such con-
duct becomes purely arbitrary and dictatorial under the Constitution.
Surely the National Industrial Recovery Act and its Codes were
conceived in a high and beneficial purpose. The President has been
delegated with powers 18 to conserve a valuable natural resource 19
and to regulate commerce in regard thereto under Section 9 (c).
" 1 BEARD AND BEARD, RISE oF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1930) at 408;
1 WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATiS HISTORY (1932) at 316 et seq.
" 2 BEARD AND BEARD, supra, at 365.
" "To make a long story short, with the connivance of Roosevelt a revolu-
tion was staged in Panama; the province seceded; American war 'vessels
prevented Colombian troops from landing to quell it. We recognized the new
nation of Panama almost overnight, and made a treaty with her by which we
leased the 'Canal Zone' in perpetuity." ADAMS, THE Epic OF AMERICA (1931)
at 357.
1O 2 BEARD AND BEARD, supra note 13, at 654-658.
' DODD, STATESMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH (1929) at 61-65.
"s "The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate
and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or with-
drawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order pre-
scribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized
agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under
the provisions of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not to exceed
$1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both." N. I. R. A.,
Public. No. 67, 73d Cong., H. R. 5755, tit. I, 9 (c).
" Ickes, After the Oil Deluge, What Price Gasoline. (1935) 207 SATURDAY
EVENING POST 33, at 5.
NOTES AND COMMENT
The Supreme Court finds that motive rather than mode of enforce-
ment is to guide the President under such section. He is given un-
fettered discretion to act in accordance with his belief concerning
the best course. There is no express standard, no specific and par-
ticular criterion governing his determinations; there is no require-
ment of findings by the executive as a condition precedent to action;
the guiding policy under which he is to act is vague and altogether
too general in scope. The requisite that executive action within the
pattern of a declared Congressional policy must be susceptible of
judicial review is not met; no tangible or intangible framework of
policy on which a court may operate is distinguishable.
"New Dealers," exercised over the curtailment of Presidential
authority, might urge that the rule of expediehcy supersedes the rule
of basic principle. The Supreme Court has held otherwise, Justice
Cardozo dissenting. The problem of enforcement of the Recovery
Act 20 resolves itself into Constitutional questions rather than into
programs of expediency. The difficulty of enforcement has loomed
as an obvious problem for solution; it will continue so to loom.
There have been numerous obstacles in the path of such enforce-
ment; some have been on a constitutional basis. The Panama case
has raised and solved the important issue of executive powers dele-
gated by the Congress. If, by subtle stages, governmental sover-
eignty may be converted into governmental tyranny and executive
pronouncement -into dictatorial and arbitrary manifesto, a return to
fundamental concepts of American government is essential. The
Panama case, therefore, cuts deeper into the core of American politi-
cal theory than would appear at first blush.
EMIL F. KOCH.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND DETERMINATION OF SECTION 7A OF
THE N. I. R. A.
Section 7 (a) of the N. I. R. A.1 and code provisions relating
to hours and wages, constitute the primary contributions of the Re-
covery Act to labor law. Prior to its enactment the labor unions
were slowly but surely sinking into stagnation.2 Its enactment was
hailed by labor as its resurrection. 3 It guaranteed labor free reign
""President Roosevelt has said: 'All employers in each trade now band
themselves faithfully in these modern guilds.' It will be interesting and
instructive to note the construction which the courts will put (or be forced to
put) on the words 'all' and 'faithfully' when applying them to powerful indus-
trial units." (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406.
148 STAT. 198, 15 U. S. C. A. §707 A (1933).
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1934, at 210, 211.
TODAY, Feb. 10, 1934, at 3.
